deSEC


Free, Secure, and Easy DNS Hosting

Section 1

DNS & DNSSEC


A Bird's-eye View





Clients and DNS Resolvers





Resolvers and Authoritative Servers Root DNS Server Auth. DNS Server org. Auth. DNS Server mozilla.org. v.mozilla.org? :4700::6810:2902 www.mozilla.org? 2606:4700::6810:2902 Auth. DNS Server **DNS-Resolver** for www.mozilla.org.

DNS Security Extensions: DNSSEC Root DNS Server Root of Trust Auth. DNS Server org. Auth. DNS Server mozilla.org. **DNS-Resolver** Signature Verification Auth. DNS Server for www.mozilla.org.

Section 2

The State of DNS Security and Usability



Facepalm picture licensed under the <u>Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic</u> license, cropped to fit slide and colors modified. Original post by Alex E. Proimos at https://www.flickr.com/photos/34120957@N04/4199675334.

Domainverwaltung								
-	nils-wisiol.de (changed: 2015-03-20 14:19:47)							
DNS Verwaltung DNS ändern	SOA Data	TTL 86400 ▼ hostname ns5.a4a-dns.de	e email root@ns5.a4a	a-dns.de				
DNS löschen	Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼ nils-wisiol.de	IN NS ns5.a4a-dns.de	remove ?				
DNS Lookup	Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼ nils-wisiol.de	IN NS ns6.a4a-dns.de	remove ?				
Nameserver Verwaltung	Resource Record	πL 86400 ▼ nils-wisiol.de	IN A 178.63.189.70	remove ?				
Handle Verwaltung	Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼ www.nils-wisiol.de	IN A 178.63.189.70	remove ?				
nTLD Vorreservierung	Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼ *.nils-wisiol.de	IN A 178.63.189.70	remove ?				
	Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼ nils-wisiol.de	IN MX 10 sn4b.de	remove ?				
	Resource Record	πL 86400 ▼ mail.nils-wisiol.de	IN A 178.63.189.74	remove ?				
	Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼ nils-wisiol.de	IN MX 20 sn7b.de	remove ?				
	ADD Resource Record	TTL 86400 ▼	IN A ▼ priority(MX,SR	v)				

Before we started deSEC, this is how I had to manage my DNS records

owe	radmii	U.								
n Search	zones and records	a List zones List zone templates List aupermesters Add master zone	e Add slave zone Add sup	ormaster Bulk re	gistration User administration Logost					
dit zo	ne "	erlin.de"								
Show page: [1,2,3,3,4,5,5,6]										
8	id 3	Name in.de	Type SOA		Content	Priority	TTL 360			
8	147	bertin.de	NS	~	amminue inde	0	360			
8	149	lamente de la companya de la company	NS	~	and are tinde	0	360			
3	11	s ee berlin.de	NS	~	and the second section of the sectio	0	360			
3	13	general artin.de	NS	~	american and an analysis and a	0	360			
3	15	ammunderlin.de	A	~	100000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	360			
ì	17	amilion berlin.de	A	v	178	0	360			
	19	ap berlin.de	CNAME	~	approximation berlinde	0	360			
	21	buckupanen - austru-berlin.de	CNAME	~	mmaneeartin.de	0	360			
1	35	du us.tu-berlin.de	A	~	1776-04-0700-15	0	360			
3	23	hmhumilimen illimin berlin.de	Α	~	107000-000000.7	0	360			
3	25	bum werlin.de	A	~	100249.230.63	0	360			
3	27	limmuse efin.de	Α	~	30.31	0	360			
3	97	hannani alama berlin.de	A	~	130.159	0	360			
3	105	boom: erlin.de	A	~	135	0	360			
ì	371	banhamanin and serlin.de	A	~	10000400020.191	0	360			
	29	billion erlin.de	CNAME	v	berlin.de	0	360			
ì	31	campbelle de	А	~	122042000000000000000000000000000000000	0	360			

Another way to do it

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Hijacking DNS Subdomains via Subzone Registration: A Case for Signed Zones

Peter Thomassen, Jan Benninger, Marian Margraf

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ABSTRACT

We investigate how the widespread absence of signatures in DNS (Domain Name System) delegations, in combination with a common misunderstanding with regards to the DNS specification, has led to insecure deployments of authoritative DNS servers which allow for hijacking of subdomains without the domain owner's consent. This, in turn, enables the attacker to perform effective man-in-the-middle attacks on the victim's online services, including TLS (Transport Layer Security) secured connections, without having to touch the victim's DNS zone or leaving a trace on the machine providing the compromised service, such as the web or mail server. Following the practice of responsible disclosure, we present examples of such insecure deployments and suggest remedies for the problem. Most prominently, DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) can be used to turn the problem from an integrity breach into a denial-of-service issue, while more thorough user management resolves the issue completely.

TYPE OF PAPER AND KEYWORDS

Regular research paper: DNS, security, domain, subdomain, zone, man in the middle, TLS certificate, ACME DNS

1 INTRODUCTION


Before a connection to a named Internet host (e.g. www.fu-berlin.de) can be established, it is necessary to determine the IP address associated with the host name. This lookup is done using the Domain Name System


with a myriad of Internet access providers maintaining their own caches. Thus, the correct operation of an authoritative DNS service is a non-trivial task.

Furthermore, while being initially intended and still primarily used for IP lookups, the DNS has been seeing

When we started deSEC, this is how we were able to take over DNS zones and issue Let's Encrypt certificates for a couple of zones hosted by affected providers

This is how we let US companies decide what's acceptable speech and what is not





For the last 15 years, all of us at Dyn have taken pride in offering a free version of our Dynamic DNS Pro product. What was originally a product built for a small group of users has blossomed into an exciting technology used around the world.

That is why with mixed emotions we announced the end of that free hostname program today, officially turning down on May 7th.

Of course, the big question when these things happen is, "Why?"

– We have an obligation to have the cleanest DNS network possible. There is a danger to a free infrastructure and over the years, we have seen mixed results from our freemium model. We have seen an increase in abuse and a portion of users

This is how a popular dynamic DNS service closed in 2014

Things That are Desperately Missing

Usability

- API access
- Convenience features like search and replace
- Flexibility in record types and TTLs

Security

DNSSEC

Organization


- Data protection
- European laws
- Free open-source software
- Low cost hosting




§ 24 Abs. 1 UrhG

Section 3


deSEC:
DNS Hosting for
Everyone





Home Use: Permanently Free Dynamic DNS




Professional Use: Good-Looking Web Management App









Power Use: Easy API Access

- Open to everyone
- Only email-address needed
- Extensive documentation at desec.readthedocs.io
- Support for almost all record types and TTLs
- Automatic DNSSEC for everything
- Let's Encrypt Support,
 TLSA tools, PGP key, etc.
 can be built on top

Live Demo 😱

Get Your Laptops Out

https://dnslookup.online https://dnsquery.org/

40/0

19%

of websites use DNSSEC

of Internet users validate DNSSEC signatures

Under .de.,

10/0

of zones use DNSSEC

In Germany,

46%

of Internet users validate DNSSEC signatures

Global Delivery, Local Cryptography

- Global anycast network for rapid responses to queries
- Local storage of cryptographic keys



Organisational and Legal

- Based in Berlin
- All source code and discussions on <u>https://github.com/desec-io/</u>
- Not-For-Profit *Verein*
- Sponsoring for permanently free hosting is planned
- Built-in data protection



Things That We Can Fix

Usability


- o API Access 🗸
- Convenience features like search and replace planned
- Flexibility in record types and TTLs

Security

o DNSSEC 🗸

• Organization

- Data protection ✓
- European laws 🗸
- Free open-source software ✓
- Low cost hosting ✓




§ 24 Abs. 1 UrhG


Section 4

Technical Solution


```
image: desec/dedyn-www:latest
image: desec/dedyn-static:latest
networks:
- rearww
```

Public Interfaces: HTTP, DNS





We're Launching in July 2019



Thank You

https://desec.io/ https://github.com/desec-io/

Excited? Sign up for our mailing list at desec.io!

7 May 2019 · Crypto Meetup Berlin

deSEC

Dr. Peter Thomassen Nils Wisiol

Donations kindly accepted: we take code and money



Discussion

- Abuse scenarios
 - Free, anonymous zones
 - Blocking in some applications on public-suffix level?
- Security of private user data and keys
- Threats in misconfiguration of DNS servers
- DDoS